Thoughts on Theological Methodology

What follows is an excerpt from an essay I wrote on theological methodology. Most of the concepts in here are some of the results of my cogitation on the subject over the past year or so. I'm interested to hear thoughts, comments, and critiques (because I'm sure there are plenty!).
E
ast-West Differences in Theological Methodology
In chapter three of his book Being as Communion, Zizioulas hints at a key methodological difference in regard to the relationship of the Eastern and Western churches and their respective tendency toward Pneumatology (in the East) and Christology (in the West). He states: “For various reasons which have to do with the idiosyncrasy of the West (concern with history, ethics, etc.), a certain priority will always be given by it to Christology over Pneumatology. … Equally, for the East Pneumatology will always occupy an important place given the fact that a liturgical meta-historical approach to Christian existence seems to mark the Eastern ethos.” In this sense, Zizioulas’ contention points out the fundamental paradox that is foundational for understanding the later theological developments by both the Eastern and Western churches. The paradox lies in the fact that theological methodology governs theological doctrine while at the same time these developments in theological doctrine govern theological methodology. For this reason, the filioque seems to be merely the first evidential symptom of a much deeper problematic incongruency. Throughout the high era of Patristic theological development, the Eastern and Western churches were mostly compliant with one another, but the theological and methodological differences (in addition to numerous geographical and political struggles) eventually began to further separate the one Church into two churches. There is some debate on the issue of whether or not the filioque was the key first difference between the two systems of theological thought, but pragmatically it is evident that the cause of the differences had to either be the filioque or something quite similar because the parameters and details of the filioque seemed to lead to or at least have a place in the development of what some would see as a Christo-monistic West. On the basis of this Christo-centrism, the methodology of the Western Church is much more historical and rational than the Pneumatologically-focused Eastern Church, because of this methodological difference the advancements in theological understanding will soon diverge into two entirely different enterprises. But before turning to the resulting theological developments, it is necessary to begin to articulate the methodological differences between the two perspectives.
The convergence point of differing views on revelation and thus on theological methodology is the Church; it is for this reason that the Church has been divided for the majority of its existence. The methodological paradox wherein differing perspectives on the primitive, Pauline theology immediately began to show itself as having growing implications on the individual Eastern and Western theologies and thus on the development of theological methodologies. In this sense, the schism of the Church is merely the visible symptom of a methodologically-based cyclo-linear self-perpetuation of differing views on the fundamentality of Christian truth. The perspective one has on a certain theological issues carries pragmatic implications on the liturgical worship that takes place within the tradition of that ecclesial perspective. Once doctrine goes from theory to practice, the practice of that theory begins to color both the theological ethos of the liturgical and, by means of the lex orandi lex credendi, the basis and methodology of further theological development. Zizioulas’ points to this phenomenon in his statement that: “On the liturgical level these two approaches became quite distinct very early with the development of two traditions concerning the relationship between baptism and confirmation (or christmation). … Given the fact that confirmation was normally regarded as the rite of the ‘giving of the Spirit,’ one could argue that in cases where confirmation preceded baptism we had a priority of Pneumatology over Christology, while in the other case we had the reverse.”
In this sense, the life of the Church is inextricably linked with theology and thus any attempt at ecclesiastical reunion between the Eastern and Western churches cannot take place apart from the recasting of a unified theological methodology. As can be seen by the fact that theological methodology is linked to an epistemologically-driven priority regarding the Son and the Spirit, the ecumenical endeavor will at best succeed in the establishment of a superficial signification that is fatally flawed due to the fact that no deeper theological unity will exist if the dialogue does not turn in the direction of answering the following concerns: first, whether priority exists between the economic, historical manifestations of the Holy Spirit and Jesus Christ; second, the relationship of equal ontological dependence between the Holy Spirit and Jesus Christ; third, the significance that theological methodology (and thus revelation) has on views of the heilgeschichte; and finally, the influence that these views and their effects have on the liturgical subject of God’s self-revelation.

Methodological Typologies:

West: Christological Bent
-“has been revealed”
-Perfect Passive Indicative
-Rational methodology
-ethics from Christ’s example
-natural theology
-Scripture is revelation

East: Pneumatological Bent
-“is being revealed”
-Present Passive Indicative
-Mystical methodology
-inward spiritual change
-mystical theology
-Scripture confirms revelation

IV. Ecclesiological Primacy of Theology and Revelation
As previously discussed, the liturgy serves as both the foundation and pragmatic manifestation of theological development. The reasons behind the ecclesiological primacy of theology are multifarious, but understanding these facets of the symbiotic relationship between theology and the Church is beneficial to the task of placing the theologian within the Church and its Tradition.
The Church is commonly understood to be the ordinary means of soteriological grace to the world, two things are implicit within this statement: first, the predication that the Church is the ordinary means of grace is built upon the assumption that God may choose to communicate his salvific grace at certain times and places to those and through those who exists outside of the Church; and second, the soteriological grace is always ordinarily communicated alongside of an epistemological, and proposition grace of revelation. Because of this, the Church understands the two-fold nature of revelation to be historically manifested in the Communion of Saints on the soteriological realm and in the Tradition of Christian doctrine on the epistemic realm.
The Tradition of the Church is historical record of the communally [consensus] accepted interpretation of the revelation of God in the Incarnation of Christ, in Scripture, in God’s actions in history, and in the experience of Holy Spirit. Equally important along with this revelation of God is the communal establishment of the categories by which to: first, interpret the facets and datum of God’s self-revelation; second, communicate this Truth to the laity standing within the Church via Apostolic ministry, sacrament, and exhortation against heresy, schism, nominalism, and other causes of strife within the Church; and third to the non-Churched world by means of witness in word and deed, apologetic argumentation, and signs and miracles.
The Church provides the faith atmosphere for theology to take place. What we find in those church traditions that emphasize the Christological to the detriment of the Pneumatological is a mistaken perspective wherein the present is eliminated because God has only revealed himself in the past. This sort of revelatory cessationism then must rely strictly upon the Scriptures for truth because they record both God’s actions in history, the revelation that come in the Incarnation, and the early stages of doctrinal development in the light of this fuller revelation. Likewise, the converse can be found in those church traditions that emphasize the Pneumatological to the detriment of the Christological in the sense that the Spirit empowered Christ in the same way that He empowers believers today; the canon of revelation is more open than it has ever been thus confirming the idea that the Scriptures only confirm the present revelation.
The integration point between this comes about in three things: 1) Recognizing that the Tradition of the Church is not a calcified historical entity, rather it has been and is the collection of affirmations by the Church community that provides the canon by which to judge the veracity of personal revelations. 2) Realizing that one can’t understand the present without understanding the past, and likewise one can’t view the past without at least standing in the present (otherwise the past is not the past). 3) Realizing that because the Gospels point to a symbiotic relationship between the Son and Spirit, this provides the foundation for understanding how past revelation and present revelation are interdependent upon one another. 4) By affirming that the Tradition only exists within the faith community of the Church, the liturgical and theological development should take place and move from within the Church to outside of it.

comments on the current discussion

If you are just joining the discussion, see the excellent and insightful comments made by Curt in response to my series of posts on arguments for God’s existence. (see my previous post)

Curt, I agree with your comments regarding the ineffectiveness of the arguments for the existence of God to really bring about the true epistemological (et al) changes that must take place if one is to become a devoted follower of Christ. My reasoning behind formulating the post-script (in addition to clarifying my conclusion) was to attempt to demonstrate the falsity of the idea of the philosopher (and I would assert that even more so of the theologian) as a detached observer simply recording the facts as they appear on the page. The task of Christianity, science, philosophy, etc. is so much greater than that. If Polanyi is correct, and I think he is, in his assertion of the presence of a ‘tacit dimension’ in all people then we must begin to take seriously the idea of ‘faith seeking understanding.’ (I need to get you my copy of Tacit Knowing, Truthful Knowing about Michael Polanyi) I think history has shown us (as it so often does) that the arguments for God’s existence lend themselves to be equally strengthened or weakened on the basis of logic and intention.

In regard to what you said about non-Christians living in darkness and unbelief, I certainly agree with you. Might we be able to develop this further? From my perspective (as well as what little I know of Barthian Christological thought), I think that this distinction between non-Christians and Christians entails (as we all know) much more than a strict spiritual, behavior, ethical sense. What if our predication about Christ being the “mediator for the atonement of our sins” or “the wrath-absorbing propitiation”, et al, entails also an epistemological motif. I think we see this in the knowledge-ignorance motif. In the same way that the hypostatic union of human and divine enables salvation, I think it also enables a drastic epistemological shift. Just a thought I’ve been playing with for a while. Interested to hear your thoughts.

In a ‘faith seeking understanding’ model, this seems to go against the modernist notions (no doubt developed in the lab rather than the library or classroom) of an empirically-driven truth. If things can be proven, then they are truthful; ok, I accept that. What I do not accept is the idea that if things are truthful, then they can be proven. Going back to the ontological and cosmological argument discussion, I think we see that these arguments (as much as some might like them to be) are not the ordinary means by which God works, but they should be included in the category of extra-ordinary means. To take this discussion to a more practical level, does this mean that we should erase them from our Ravi Zacharias and Norman Geisler texts (I’m not trying to give them a bad name even though I don’t see them to be as helpful as they might insist), No. Are some people drastically changed by these means? Yes.

If God can use the song of a small child to draw unto Himself one of the most influential –pastor-theologians of the Early Church, then he can use even the most broken and leaky vessels for his ministry. So it is with these arguments.


Next to come, my next post will attempt to develop a gift economy of theology from the writings of the Early Apologists, this will have implications both on the patron-client relationship between the man and God as well as on anthropological theological methodology.

post-script to ontological/cosmological arguments and Truth

My apologies about the last post, I don’t think I communicated my thoughts clearly enough in regard to the links or correspondence between the cosmological and the ontological arguments. While taking my morning shower, I re-figured it all and found a better way of stating my question.

1. God, a being of whom there is nothing greater, exists both in the mind and thus must exist in reality (just suppose the veracity of the ontological argument with me, if only for a minute or two).

2. If God (a being of whom there is nothing greater) truly does exist, then he is the First Cause because he cannot be part of an infinite regression of causes (because if so, there would be something greater than God).

3. So, either the ontological argument is true thus proving the truth of the cosmological argument, or neither is true and we then must reconsider our idea of God.

4. We must change our idea of God because he cannot be both the greatest being and part of an infinite regression of causes, it is just a contradiction.

From this discussion, we see what I think is a bit of a flaw regarding arguments (I have yet to consider the teleological(s) and the religious experience argumentation, although my hunch is that the argument from religious experience will also hinge on the predication that stands as the fulcrum for the ontological and cosmological arguments), it is as follows: these arguments work just fine in a correspondence theory of truth. Thus functioning as evidence to back an a postiori claim, but don’t seem to hold enough water to function as a priori proofs. In other words, while I am not denying their ability to be used to convert atheist and agnostic skeptics into believers (or at the very least theists) (in this regard see my response to Ben about broken and leaky vessels), I think they a made to function in a ‘faith seeking understanding’ model.
Is it possible for them to function in an a priori, inductive sort of way?
Can they rightfully be used in a pragmatic test of truth?

Also, I’ll explain more about the argument from religious experience in a future post. As I was finishing this last section, I realized that the religious experience argument works best on a correspondence theory of truth as well (but more on that later).

Hope this clarifies things. I’d love to hear your comments.

post-script to ontological/cosmological arguments and Truth

My apologies about the last post, I don’t think I communicated my thoughts clearly enough in regard to the links or correspondence between the cosmological and the ontological arguments. While taking my morning shower, I re-figured it all and found a better way of stating my question.

1. God, a being of whom there is nothing greater, exists both in the mind and thus must exist in reality (just suppose the veracity of the ontological argument with me, if only for a minute or two).

2. If God (a being of whom there is nothing greater) truly does exist, then he is the First Cause because he cannot be part of an infinite regression of causes (because if so, there would be something greater than God).

3. So, either the ontological argument is true thus proving the truth of the cosmological argument, or neither is true and we then must reconsider our idea of God.

4. We must change our idea of God because he cannot be both the greatest being and part of an infinite regression of causes, it is just a contradiction.

From this discussion, we see what I think is a bit of a flaw regarding arguments (I have yet to consider the teleological(s) and the religious experience argumentation, although my hunch is that the argument from religious experience will also hinge on the predication that stands as the fulcrum for the ontological and cosmological arguments), it is as follows: these arguments work just fine in a correspondence theory of truth. Thus functioning as evidence to back an a postiori claim, but don’t seem to hold enough water to function as a priori proofs. In other words, while I am not denying their ability to be used to convert atheist and agnostic skeptics into believers (or at the very least theists) (in this regard see my response to Ben about broken and leaky vessels), I think they a made to function in a ‘faith seeking understanding’ model.
Is it possible for them to function in an a priori, deductive sort of way?
Can they rightfully be used in a pragmatic test of truth?

Also, I’ll explain more about the argument from religious experience in a future post. As I was finishing this last section, I realized that the religious experience argument works best on a correspondence theory of truth as well (but more on that later).

Hope this clarifies things. I’d love to hear your comments.

Ontological/Cosmological Arguments and Truth Tests

The Kalam argument goes as follows:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
The form of the argument seems to be valid, we must then analyze the premises of the argument. First off, we have ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause’, we must asked about the nature of the existence of the cause. It does make sense that when things begin to exist, they must have something to cause them to being their existence; but what do we do about the ontology of the ‘causer’. If this uncaused cause is God and God is has existed eternally, then we have our solution. This tactic uses the logical operation found at the end of a reductio ad absurdum argument, thus in order to disprove the validity of the premise ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause’, we must attempt to pry into the absurdity that turns our attention away from a cause for God and toward the idea that God has existed eternally. What is eternity? Is it the absence of time? Is it the pure present of time and space with no voids or gaps and thus no movement? Is eternity even predicated to exist in some relation to the time/space continuum? For our purposes, I think a good answer in regard to the question of time is as follows: the measurement of movement in space. Thus time is linked to movement which is found in space, in essence, creating the space-time continuum. If this is our definition of time, then it is possible for God to exist eternally. But, we still haven’t linked time and eternity; if time is a measurement of the space a moving object traveled in relation to its speed and God is the First Cause. Then, it is valid to say that God exists eternally because before God began to create (or cause things to begin to exist), there was no movement and thus no time. This relates back to the typical form of the cosmological argument in that we still are left with two basic options, one being a little harder to prove than the other:
1. God is the First Cause and has existed eternally because before He began to create, there was no movement and thus no need for time as a measurement of that movement.
2. God is the main Cause but was Himself caused by something higher than God, thus this something must either be eternal or was itself caused by something even greater, and so on, and so on.

We are left with the same reductio ad absurdum argument on which this all begins.
We are left with one possibility, and this is purely conjecture on my part, what if we combine some of the parts of the ontological argument and the cosmological (Kalam, Aristotelian, Aquinian, or any other statement of it) argument. Can we do this? Well, yes and no. Yes, because both are dealing reductio ad absurdum argumentation (granted they are related to it in differing degrees). No, because unlike the ontological argument, the cosmological argument begins with a positive fact (things exist, or Kalam-‘things begin to exist) where the cosmological argument must begin with a negative fact (‘Only the fool hath said in his heart that there is no God’ while recognizing that there is a rational claim for God’s existence). Let’s skip to the last few steps of these arguments and attempt to integrate them.

1. Ontological: God, a being of which there is no greater, exists.
2. Cosmological: God is either the first Cause or is part of an infinite chain of regressions.
3. Ontological: We have an understanding of the idea of God, but believe he doesn’t exist. (we object to premise 1)
4. Cosmological: God must be the First Cause or we must change our idea of God.

Thus, we have gotten exactly to the point to which I wanted to bring us. This line of argumentation shows one substantial flaw of arguments for the existence of God. We come to them with an idea of God, thus the arguments are not pragmatic tests by any means, but more of evidential conglomerations. In our current philosophical zeitgeist, does a correspondence theory of truth hold any water or must we only resort to pragmatic tests?

My apologies on grammatical mistakes and/or faulty wording, I’ll read over this at a later time and edit it but for now this will have to do (I wrote this in about 20 minutes so forgive me for my hastiness).

Feel free to tear me apart on all of this. Comments, suggestions, and critiques are welcome.

Squabbles about the Ontological Argument: 'reductio ad absurdum' and modal logic approaches

I must start off with voicing my affection for the ontological argument. I think it is one of the only arguments for God’s existence that don’t arrive at a conclusion in a purely deductive manner. I also see it as one that doesn’t arrive at or assume anything via negativa. What follows are two explanations that, in writing them all out, helped me find some veracity in the ontological argument. I must say that I agree with Kant’s dictum ‘copula-predicate’ critique of the ontological argument, but apart from that I think the argument still holds water (at least it holds more than it leaks). Much of the modal logic comes from my reading of Chellas work, Introduction to Modal Logic.

Anselm’s form of the argument as found in the Proslogian follows the logical form of a reductio ad absurdum aiming to refute the fool in Psalm 14:1 (The fool hath said in his heart, [There is] no God.) From this line of claim we are saying two things of the fool:
1. The fool understands the claim that God exists.
2. The fool himself does not believe that God exists.

If we understand that God is (as Anselm states) “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived,” then we move to the next point in Anselm’s argument, which is as follows:

“And assuredly, that than which nothing greater can be conceived cannot exist in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality, which is greater. Therefore, if that than which nothing greater can be conceived exists in the understanding alone, [then] the very being than which nothing greater can be conceived is one than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible.”

From this we see (as I have highlighted) some main points that are beneficial in outlining the argument. But before we can jump into the sequence of the logic of the reductio ad absurdum, we must make a distinction which is vital to the very strength of the argument; there is a distinction between existing in reality, existing in understanding, and existing in both realms. For instance, we can think of things like unicorns, aliens, the city of Atlantis, the Loch Ness monster, etc.; also, we also know that things exist in reality but we are uncertain about actually knowing them: undiscovered stars and solar systems, species, subatomic particles or energies, etc. We can also know that things exist and we are certainly knowledgeable of their existence, such as: Saddam Hussein, baseball bats, elements, etc.

Now, Let us outline the argument as follows:

1. Suppose (alongside the fool) that God exists in the understanding alone.
2. Given our definition, this means that a being than which none greater can be conceived exists in the understanding alone.
3. But this being can be conceived to exist in reality. That is, we can conceive of a circumstance in which theism is true, even if we do not believe that it actually obtains.
4. But it is greater for a thing to exist in reality than for it to exist in the understanding alone.
5. Hence we seem forced to conclude that a being than which none greater can be conceived can be conceived to be greater than it is.
6. But that is absurd. (thus demonstrating that classic structure of the reductio ad absurdum argument)
Ergo…
7. So (1) must be false. God must exist in reality as well as in the understanding.

To this outline we add the final paragraph needed in outlining the argument, which supports our conclusion.

“Therefore, if that than which nothing greater can be conceived exists in the understanding alone, the very being than which nothing greater can be conceived is one than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence there is no doubt that there exists a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.”

I think utilizing this sort of structure of the argument shows its validity.

In short,
If we affirm that we understand the claim that God (a being of which none greater can be conceived) exists. And if it is greater to exist in reality [and be understood] than to exist in solely in understanding, then we must affirm that God exists in reality.

Another method of proving the ontological argument which was extremely helpful in my thought on this entails modal logic . First off, let me define the modal operators.
a. possible: True in at least one possible world.
b. contingent: True in some possible worlds, false in some possible worlds.
c. necessary: True in all possible worlds.

What we mean by the language of ‘possible worlds’ can be personified by an example such as the following: Bill Clinton was the president of the United States. This is a possible statement because there is at least one possible world where there really is a Bill Clinton, a president, and the United States all co-existent in a relationship as described in the example sentence. Possible statements can be contingent ones, and contingent statements by their very definition are possible. Thus it is a contingent statement to say that there is a world where the something is missing either in nouns found in the example and/or in their relationship to each other (i.e. Bill Clinton was not the president of the United States, et al). Moving on to necessary statements, a necessary statement is one that weaves a common thread throughout the worlds. Some necessary statements would be the law of non-contradiction, the law of excluded middle (it is either A or B and there is no middle ground), 2+2=4, etc.
From this example and definition, we see that a possible statement (one that’s true in at least one possible world) can also be necessary (true in all possible worlds), and all necessary statements are possible. However, a contingent statement (one that’s true in some possible worlds, and false in some others) cannot be a necessary statement, and no necessary statements are contingent.
With that in mind, we can move on to the actual argument.

Premise 1: (This statement rings true in all possible worlds)
If God (the greatest possible being having the highest possible existence ) exists, He exists necessarily. (Necessary existence being higher and greater than possible or contingent existence) Definition: God is defined as the greatest possible being. The greatest possible being would by definition have the greatest possible form of existence (if he exists). Since this statement is true by definition, it holds true in all possible worlds.. Therefore, because it is true as a consequence of definitions, in any possible world the following statement is true: if God (defined as the greatest possible being) exists he would (by definition) have the greatest possible form of existence (which is necessary existence).

Premise 2: It is possible for God to exist.
Definition: God is defined as the greatest possible being. If a being is possible, it cannot be impossible. Were it the case that the being was perfect to an extent that is not possible, it would not be the greatest possible being. Given its coherent meaning then, it would be irrational to claim that the greatest possible being cannot possibly exist.

→If God necessarily exists (i.e. if God exists in all possible worlds and reality is itself a possible world), then he exists.

To put it all very simply:
God, a being who has highest existence (that of existing in all possible worlds), exists in all possible worlds.
Reality is itself a possible world.
Therefore, if God exists in all possible worlds then he exists in reality.

Ok. So what do you think? comments, critiques, disagreements are welcome.

Meditations on Lent, part 12 of 40

Fasting can be, when placed in the proper spiritual context, a means of grace by which we begin to focus solely on Christ thus on finding our true self in Him. As we seek, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, to be ever repentent and reflective on the state of our salvation- we are (to refer back to Lewis' analogy) seeking to see the Son and thus the true life, even if this means giving up our current perspectival view of the matters of this world. It is in standing in the beam of light that we see the Light and Life of all that exists-Christ. It is by our repentence that we move toward the light, and it is only by God's gift of grace that we can strive toward the light and eventually bask in its rays. This prevenient grace, as we respond to it, draws and woos us closer and closer to the Way and thus when we are in the Way we see what the Way points us to, which is simply the Way itself. The Trinity is the Gift and Giver, and need not the two be confused because the Gift is the Holy Spirit and the Giver is the Father's love for man enabled and empowered through the work of Christ. This Gift and Giver language points out, I think, an important point in regard to coming to a better understanding of what true Trinitarian spirituality really is- it is participation in the equality and simplicity of the three persons of the Godhead, while being personally enabled to do so by being in the Spirit which can only come about as a result of the work of the Son and the fulcrum on which the gifts of grace moves is the Father.

I want us to consider something I've been thinking about for a few days now, what if repentence isn't about striving toward personal perfection? This question may sound at first to be a bit off, but when we think about it we find that it cannot be farther from the Truth. Just like in the No Child Left Behind Act (don't even get me started on this ridiculous area of American education), when we focus on quantitative results, we lose both qualitative and quantitative results; but when we focus on qualitative results, we find a sudden increase in the qualitative results and thus a slow but steady increase quantitative results. I think the statement (or question as first mentioned) is better phrased as "repentence is about incorporated participation in the energies of the Godhead." When we focus on our own perfection, we lose all hope of perfection because we, like Peter, have lost sight of the Way to perfection. But when we don't focus on our own perfection and instead we focus upon Christ as the Giver of all good and perfect gifts (including perfection), we find that it is out of this uninterrupted 'I-Thou ' relationship that we find ourselves being perfected from the very center of our being and eventually all our actions are perfected because our being is perfected. How does this relate to Lent you might ask. It certainly relates because when we focus on eating certain things and not eating other things and sticking to the new 'diet' out of sheer will power, we miss everything. Our fasting should not be done out of the will to power to be perfected, it should be focused on Christ and should be ever-rememberant of Christ. What we find in this is the difference between being 'Christ-centered' and 'in Christ' (see previous meditation).

P.S. Sorry about my little sabbatical, I had to knock out some papers. I'll be writing alot of these to catch back up so keep an eye on the site. Comments are welcome!

Meditations on Lent, part 11 of 40

In light of the last entry, if we are to be "in Christ" let us consider and contemplate what this might mean in regard to fasting. Fasting as an exercise in more fulling identifying with the passion of Christ leading to fasting as living into Christ. We are justified and made righteous in Christ, thus it is in Christ that we find our new life as Christians. As previously mentioned, life in Christ is enabled by the work of the Holy Spirit and it is through the Holy Spirit that we are sanctified and illumined in Christ. I want to consider the implications that "through the Holy Spirit" might have on both our life as Christians as well as our vocations to be Christian integrators of faith and learning.

C.S. Lewis states the following in the essay "Meditations on a Toolshed" found in the book, God in the Dock: "I was standing today in a dark toolshed. The sun was shining outside and through the crack at the top of the door there came a sunbeam. From where I stood that beam of light, with the specks of dust floating in it, was the most striking thing in the place. Everything was almost pitch-black. I was seeing the beam, but not seeing things by it. Then i moved so that the beam fell on my eyes. Instantly the whole previous picture vanished. I saw no toolshed, and (above all) no beam. Instead I saw, framed in the irregular cranny at the top of the door, green leaves moving on the branches of a tree outside, and beyond that, 90 odd million miles away, the sun. Looking along the beam and looking at the beam are very difference experiences."

He goes on to discuss various approaches to the act of thinking, but I think this little bit demonstrates my point exactly. If we merely look into Christ, we miss the whole point; thus it is only by being in Christ through the work of the Holy Spirit that we can begin to truly see God. So how do we, through the work of the Spirit, begin to live in Christ? By grace. By striving toward Christ only by the indwelling Holy Spirit which is itself a gift of God's grace.